The Myth of Thamus and Theuth Does writing allow the pretense of understanding, rather than true understanding?

In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates shares the myth of Thamus and Theuth, questioning the invention of writing. Writing, he argues, weakens memory and offers the appearance of wisdom without true understanding. Socrates suggests that serious discourse using the dialectic method is a nobler pursuit, leading to genuine wisdom and happiness.

Introduction

When we think about humankind’s evolution, particular inventions were a significant step forward for our species.

The invention, or should I say the evolution of spoken language, the development of writing, the creation of the printing press, and then, more recently, the Internet and the World Wide Web were major information/knowledge revolutions.

But have you ever thought that some of these inventions might have been bad? Well, maybe not bad, but they came with unintended consequences to which we have been mostly blind.

We are well aware of some of the World Wide Web’s unintended consequences, such as fake news propagated by social media. What about writing? What about the invention of writing itself? And, of course, reading —  the two go hand in hand.

Socrates questioned the wisdom of the invention of writing over 2,000 years ago and made up a little story, the Myth of Thamus and Theuth, that  Plato recorded in the Phaedrus.

The Myth

In the Phaedrus, a book by Plato about 370 BCE, Plato records a discussion between Socrates and Phaedrus about the Egyptian myth of Thamus and Theuth concerning the invention of writing.

In the conversation, Socrates criticizes writing for weakening the necessity and power of memory and allowing the pretense of understanding rather than true understanding.

The Story

Socrates: [274c] I can tell something I have heard of the ancients, but whether it is true, they only know. But if we ourselves should find it out, should we care any longer for human opinions?

Phaedrus: A ridiculous question! But tell me what you say you have heard.

Socrates: I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of the ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth.

He it was who [274d] invented numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most important of all, letters. Now the king of all Egypt at that time was the god Thamus, who lived in the great city of the upper region, which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon.

To him came Theuth to show his inventions, saying that they ought to be imparted to the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked what use there was in each, and as Theuth enumerated their uses, expressed praise or blame, according as he approved [274e] or disapproved.

The story goes that Thamus said many things to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts, which it would take too long to repeat; but when they came to the letters, “This invention, O king,” said Theuth, “will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories; for it is an elixir of memory and wisdom that I have discovered.”

But Thamus replied, “Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; [275a] and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess.

For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many things without instruction and will, therefore, seem  [275b] to know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant and hard to get along with since they are not wise, but only appear wise.

Phaedrus:  Socrates, you easily make up stories of Egypt or any country you please.

Socrates: They used to say, my friend, that the words of the oak in the holy place of Zeus at Dodona were the first prophetic utterances. The people of that time, not being so wise as you young folks, were content in their simplicity to hear an oak [275c] or a rock, provided only it spoke the truth; but to you, perhaps, it makes a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from, for you do not consider only whether his words are true or not.

Phaedrus: Your rebuke is just; and I think the Theban is right in what he says about letters.

Socrates: He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person, and in truth ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, if he thinks [275d] written words are of any use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are written.

Phaedrus: Very true.

Socrates:  Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing.

And every word, when [275e] once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself.

Phaedrus: You are quite right about that, too.

Socrates: [276a] Now tell me; is there not another kind of speech, or word, which shows itself to be the legitimate brother of this bastard one, both in the manner of its begetting and in its better and more powerful nature?

Phaedrus: What is this word and how is it begotten, as you say?

Socrates: The word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom to be silent.

Phaedrus: You mean the living and breathing word of him who knows, of which the written word may justly be called the image.

Socrates: [276b] Exactly. Now tell me this. Would a sensible husbandman, who has seeds which he cares for and which he wishes to bear fruit, plant them with serious purpose in the heat of summer in some garden of Adonis, and delight in seeing them appear in beauty in eight days, or would he do that sort of thing, when he did it at all, only in play and for amusement? Would he not, when he was in earnest, follow the rules of husbandry, plant his seeds in fitting ground, and be pleased when those which he had sowed reached their perfection in the eighth month?

Phaedrus: [276c] Yes, Socrates, he would, as you say, act in that way when in earnest and in the other way only for amusement.

Socrates: And shall we suppose that he who has knowledge of the just and the good and beautiful has less sense about his seeds than the husbandman?

Phaedrus: By no means.

Socrates: Then he will not, when in earnest, write them in ink, sowing them through a pen with words which cannot defend themselves by argument and cannot teach the truth effectually.

Phaedrus: No, at least, probably not.

Socrates: [276d] No. The gardens of letters he will, it seems, plant for amusement, and will write, when he writes, to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for others who follow the same path, and he will be pleased when he sees them putting forth tender leaves. When others engage in other amusements, refreshing themselves with banquets and kindred entertainments, he will pass the time in such pleasures as I have suggested.

Phaedrus: [276e] A noble pastime, Socrates, and a contrast to those base pleasures, the pastime of the man who can find amusement in discourse, telling stories about justice, and the other subjects of which you speak.

Socrates: Yes, Phaedrus, so it is; but, in my opinion, serious discourse about them is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him [277a] who planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other minds other words capable of continuing the process forever, and which make their possessor happy, to the farthest possible limit of human happiness.

Phaedrus: Yes, that is far nobler.

Socrates: And now, Phaedrus, since we have agreed about these matters, we can decide the others.

Phaedrus: What others?

Socrates: Those which brought us to this point.

It is crucial that we acknowledge the significance of engaging in meaningful dialogue and critical thinking to develop genuine understanding. By questioning our assumptions and participating in dialogue, we can cultivate the wisdom necessary to navigate the intricacies of our world and make well-informed decisions for the future.

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